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INTRODUCTION: VIOLENCE:
AND POSTMODERNITY
Within the general conversations on violence today, including
those of postmodern deconstruction, feminism, poststructuralism,
and various others, Ricoeur's essay, "Language and Violence,"
takes the most general perspectivc possible, including within its
sweep aJl the essays of this volunlC. For, in recent philosophical
discourses on violence. the score of considerntion onen extcnds
even to texts within a view of signst and is not limited to
interpersonal relations of one will in relation to another. And
Ricoeur's artic)e extends even beyond this to violenee in naturet
thus setting the stage for a11 of the treatises in this volume. This
artiele also shows the importance of the confrontation between
language and vioJence as underlying all human problems. It thus
takes on a special importanee for us in that it address the broadest
extension of violence between two extremes: the violence of
nature, as in hurricanes; and human violence as in the ease of
murder. Most of the essays in this volume deal with human
violencc of one fonn or another rather than the violence of nature,
thus leaving Ricoeur's in a unique place in breadth. Ricoeur
brings these two together in the realm of the intermediate, human
violence. This lattcr is inclusive of the violence of nature within
human being, and stretches the interrelation in deJving into the
ramifications in the relation between language and violence.
Ricoeur, thus, considers violence external to uSt then, the nature
intemalized that overwhelms US, and finally the violence of one
wiJl against another. It is in this context that violence and
language are seen as opposites. And Ricoeur interprets the
opposition between language and violence to be between coherent
discourse and violence, but a coherent discourse not possessed by
anyone specific, for that would be a fraudulent discourse, one that
attempts to make a philosophical particularity prevail. And
falsitied words make language thc voice of violence; violence
speaks. UThat which speaks, in relation to the meaning, is
violence" [35]. For Ricoeur, such violence of Janguage arises not
from language as code or from the anatomy of language, but,
rather, from language as discourse. The code is innocent, since it
does not speak. Rather, only discourse speaks. Thus, in contrast to
postmodern deconstruction's reduction of language, Ricoeur does
not consider violence to be linked to language as code, but, rather,
to discourse. He explicitly and clearly distinguishes words in
speech fTom the signs in dictionaries, which are not yet words, but
merely signs delineated by other signs in the code. But they take
on meaning only in the moment of discourse of a sentence. This is
the field of the confrontation between violence and language, and
not as later postmodern deconstruction would have it, between the
code and violence. And, in the three spheres of politics, poetry,
and philosophy, it is the word that is the focus of violence and
meaning in discourse.
In the contcxt of political violence, Ricoeur highlights the
role ofdiscourse in seduction, persuasion, and flattery, showing in
this context the preference for the sophist to that of the
executioner. But the violence of tyranny and revolutions does not
exhaust violence of politics, since politics exists because the city
rests on the overcoming of private violence brought to the
submission to a ru1e of law. UThe words of the city bear this
universal mark, which is a kind of non-violence" [37]. And this
rule of law is a sort of power or violence that works through
private violence to speak to language ofvalue and honor, allowing
the common will to conquer our wills.
And even the most innocent of language, that of the poet, does
not escape the tension of meaning and violent particularity. Tbe
poet, in giving himself up to meaning, in letting be, is where
language is least at our disposition, and thus is a non-violence of
discourse. Yet it is precisely here that the violence of particularity
arises. Bringing Being to the word or to meaning is a capture of
Being in the word, thus showing the appearance of the violent
man at the point where being and meaning unfold. "The poet is
the violent man who forces things to speak. It is poetic abduclion"
[38].
And the third realm of the tension of violence and language is
that of philosophy, understood as the "desire for meaning, by the
ehoice in favor of coherent discoursett, by an option for "order
and eohereneett[38-39]. With this understanding, as will be seen
in some of the tater artieles, Rieoeur supplies a context for
dialogue with postmodern deconstruction and its will to believe in
logos and the priority of the negativity latent within that option.
There are two contexts of violence in philosophical language:
first, in the violence ofthe point of departure or a beginning as an
exercise of force; then there is the violence of a particularity, a
failure to recover totally one's presuppositions; and finally, the
violence of premature conclusion, in that the process of
totalization, which can never be cJosed, is arbitrarily tenninated
in, for instance, a written account or book.
Ricoeur presents three rational conclusions around the notion
ofrational meaning or discourse that underlies an ofhis reflection
here. The first is the goal of language that must obtain if this
refleetion is to make sense, giving violence an opposite. Ricoeur
i5 here thinking not of an exterior finality imposed from without,
but of the Aristotelian context of the fun manifestation of
language. somewhat in the sense of Humboldt's view of the
"genesis of Janguage as the complete manifestation of the mind,
as its seIf-mani festation, its unfolding in plenitude" [39]. This
view of language as a call to express the thinkable nlakes possible
the dialectie of this artiete. Second, in this theoretical context of
rational meaning, understanding cannot be reduced to calculation
or to instrumental intelligence. Any such reduction of reason to
understanding ends inevitably in violence. And finally, in this
theoretical context, when caleulative intelligence takes hold of
language, it "produces the same efTects of nonsense" [39]. In this
context of calculation, knowing the structure of language, or,
Ricoeur might add today, to know the process of the structural
relations, "does not advance one a step in rational meaning. For
what is questioned is the meaning of discourse, not the structure
of the keyboard on which it plays.... Instrumental intelligence and
senseJess existence are the twin orphans of the death of meaning"
[39]. Rieoeur now turns to practical conelusions.
Ricoeur offers a few simple nllcs fOT living the intennediary
role between language and violence. He eontends that we must
recognize the fundamental opposition between Janguage and
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violence as the precondition for recognizing violence where it
appears and for having recourse to it when necessary. And such a
recourse to violence is always a "limited culpability," a calculated
fault; he who calls a crime a crime is already on the road to
meaning and salvation" [40]. Further, it is necessary to bear
witness to this formal truth of the non-violence of discourse as an
imperative; uThou shalt not kin:· recognizing the other as a
rational being to be honored. And the pressure from such a
morality of conviction on the morality of responsibility leads, for
instance in war, not doing anything that would prevent peace. And
the unique role of the non-violent person is to testi fy to all the
goals ofhistory and ofviolence. And ifsuch non-violence belongs
to the ethics of conviction, it can never take the place of the
morality of responsibility. Here, in this essay, over thirty years
ago, we already see the explicit dialectic between the ethics of
conviction, leading to teleological ethics, and to a deontological
ethics of responsibility, the latter of which leads back to a second
naivete regarding an ethics in the concrete situation ofconviction.
Ricoeur ends this essay with another rule, that of the
non-violent practice of discourse itself. While no claim is made in
favor of one mode of discourse, it, rather, respects the plurality
and diversity of Janguages, leaving the modes ofdiscourse in their
proper place. uRespect for the multiplicity, diversity, and
hierarchy of languages is the only way for men to work towards
rational meaning." [40].
Although he does not dwell on it, Ricoeur has opened the
discourse to violence in nature and in the human situation that we
perpetrate against oße ano'ther, thus opening the door for the
discussion with the postmodern deconstructionists, for whom
violcnce does not support the centrality of the human in a
humanism. This we shall now see as OUf context for beginning
this voJume. We now turn to the second article in this collection:
UTaming Violence: Ricoeur and Dcrrida:' which relates Ricoeur's
thinking to the recent broad context ofviolence in postmodemity.
Discussions of violence have recently taken a central role in
postmodern conversations of philosophy/nonphilosophy.
According to the usual script of deconstruction, the violence of
phi losophy and ofontology and, indeed, of logos in general and of
all meaning fonnation is apower play that must be subverted by
the deconstructive process. Within this general postmodern
conversation, PauJ Ricoeur, in his own way, addresses the
phenomena that deconstruction indicates as violent, taking them
in a more positive way. In späte of this fundamental difference,
Ricoeur considers violence and Janguage as contraries to Uoccupy
the totality of the human field" [32].
Within this broad context, this artiele focuses first on
postmodern deconstruction's opposition to the violence of
philosophy and logocentrism; then on the very violence latent
within the deconstructive process, beginning with that in relation
to a basic wi11 to believe, contrasting this interpretation of
violence with the surplus of meaning considered not as violence,
but rather as an attempt to render account of an excess or fullness
of sense. Second, the violence within deconstruction's diacritical
view of language and within its view of the living present is
considered, clarifying the fundamental nature of the violence of
deconstruction. Then, the role of violence in Ricoeur's
philosophy is considered in relation to the surplus ofmeaning, the
living present, and language taken as discourse. Thus, the thesis of
this article contends that deconstruction misinterprets the relation
between violence and language due to its view of the Iiving
present and sign, and that, with a revision in this view of language
(sign, word, and discourse) and the living present, the dialectic
between violence and language can be reread and replaced in a
context that makes sense out ofmaking sense.
Instead of considering violence to be intrinsic to sense, to the
living present, to presence and to anything established, it is
possible, according to this article, to see the violence intrinsic to
the very deconstructive process itself, to clotural reading, in its
priority given to the closures of sense, time, sign, presence: Le. in
the view that anything that is produced by the flux other then the
undecidable is violent. Thus, we can see that violence is intrinsic
to the whole deconstructive process at a basic level. In contrast to
deconstruction, Ricoeur's priorities do allow fOT saying something
to someone and fOT a viable semantic and ethical framework for
reflection today.
Gary Herbert, in the article "The Anatomy of Rights-Based
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Violence," shows in an extreme)y clear and precise way that the
Jogic ofnatural rights easily and inevitably leads to the conceptual
legitimization of violence, so that the conceptual culprit of much
modem violence is the western liberal-rights tradition itself. And,
in its more subtle fonns, this emphasis on individual rights and
liberties manifests itselfin the defense ofprivileges and in various
forms of nonrecognition. The conelusion drawn by the crities of
the liberal-rights tradition is that there can be no solution to the
problems of violence that does not penetrate to, and modify or
refonn these deeper conceptual substructures, so that what obtains
is a "eoexistent freedom,u where the satisfaetion of one person's
rights does not have to come at the expense of another person's
rights. UIt is to promote a system of rights in which, in the words
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'the recognition of man by man'
becomes a moral priority"[60].
Herbert shows clearly how the recognition of individual rights
is considered the metaphysicat a prior; of all moral and political
judgment, and al1 who resist this are dismissed as irrational.
Herbert sees Merleau-Ponty's positing of"the recognition ofman
by man" as required for transcending the classical rights-based
legitimization of violence. It is Herbert's suggestion that the
revolutionary recommendations for change by these crities of
political-liberaJism only point the way to transformation of
violence, easily issuing in u new forms of violence that are often
conceptually invisible to those who argue for them," remaining
nevertheless within the liberal-rights theory and thus "subject to
versions of the same critique." This becomes clear in tracing out
the evolution ofrights theory and violence in it.
Herbert traces the emergence of the idea of individual rights
from Thomas Hobbes' view of the human natural conditioß,
showing its expression as the survival impulse in relation to the
restless desire for power that serves this impulse. This condition is
not one of evil or intrinsic violence, hut rather one in which it is
reasonable for humans to have recourse to violence. According to
Hobbes, we have a right to whatever measures we deern
necessary to insure our survival, security and wellbeing, even
though we could be wrong in this assessment. This is limited only
by the power of our own imagination, since it exposes potential
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threats and justifiable responses as justifiable violence.
uUnmediated natural rights (those rights one must defend by
himselt) becomes a recipe for and justification of unlimited
violence whenever and wherever thcre is no sovereign authority,
and one finds himself in a situation where he must serve as the
sole guarantor of his own security'" [65]. Unmediated rights leads
to unending violence, with each attempting to protect himlherself
from real or imagined threats, thus themselves becoming a threat
to another. Thus the state of nature is one of unending violence.
The posed solution comes by way of invoking an irresistible
power, a sovereign with absolute power that could be a guarantee
against being subject to violence. The sovereign power serves as a
threat allowing subjects to know with certainty they are safe, since
no one would willingly bring down the power of the sovereign
upon hirnself for such acts. Herbert says: uThe problem for
subsequent philosophers in the liberal-rights tradition was to save
us from such solutions, Le., from rights based abuse of sovereign
authority. What was needed was another more sociable way of
conceiving the mediation offights that simultaneously (1) avoided
the reasonableness of. violence and (2) escaped the need for
submission to a sovereign with absolute power;' with the lauer
possibly leading to rights-based abuse of sovereign authority.
Locke adds to Hobbes' concept of rights a reflexivity that
entails a natural ownership of investing his labor in things. "One
owns all his own possessions and his own self as weil. One's life
is one's property" [68]. By considering the labor of consciousness
exercised on himself the source of acknowledging one's actions
as one's own, and thus making the person the sole property of
oneself, Locke generates the foundations of natural responsibility
in producing the foundations of natural rights. Locke considers
fights to precede and preexist all obligations, thus agreeing with
l-lobbes regarding the unilateral character of rights.
Herbert indicates that the philosophical corrective and critique
of such rights-inspired violence comes from Immanuel Kant and
Gottlieb Fichte. They viewed the natural condition to be one of no
rights, since none are recognized, thus abandoning the unilateral
character of rights. Rights exist only where there is the
corresponding obligations to respect these rights. Since such a
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view does not supposedly aJlow rights to clash, acts of violence
would be out of the question. AJong this line, Herbert indicates
that Kant defined a right as "the capacity for putting others under
obligation," thus making one's own right depend on the other's
capacity to be obligated, which can only obtain if the other is free
or autonomous, ahle to imputc onc's own actions to oneself, and
thus be aperson. Herbert quotes an important text of Kant to show
the connection among rights, fTeedom and obligation: "We know
our own freedom (from which all moral1aws and so a11 rights as
weil as duties proceed) only through the moral inlperative which
is aproposition commanding duty, from which the capacity for
putting others under obligation, that is, the concept of a right, can
afterward be explicated.tt [MellllJhysics 0/ Morals, 64] Only
another free person can invoke obligation. And it is sufficient that
mutual recognition of right be provided for without relying on the
morality of man's inner motives, which can hardly be absolutely
pure for humans, but simpJy by insisting on the exlerna/
cOllformity of his will to the law. Thus, each perceives the other
externallyasan independent will whose actions can be imputed to
hirn or her. Thus, one's capacity to obligate another and one's
rights depend on one's capacity to reveal oneselfto the other as a
free being, one who imputes his actions to hirnself. Further, all
rights are dependent "upon the reciprocally sustaining external
relationship ofwill to will in which each extemally recognizes (or
acknowledges)the other as intemal1y free" [72].
In a similar vein, Fichte says one must manifest free activity
by restricting oneselft by respecting the other·s property, thus
revealing oneself as an autonomous beingt aperson, one capable
of being obligated. And the other, only by reciprocating, can
obligate one as weil. Tbe failure of this leads to reestablishment of
the conditions of mutual violence, leading Kant to affirm that the
only original right belonging to every man in virtue of hislher
humanity Is freedom "insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of
every other in accordance with the universal law" [H, 73, Kant,
MM, 63]. By fol1owing the law of always treating the others as
free beings and not as mere things, each becomes a lawful
member of the community and yet remains completely free.
It can be seen that such a conception of rights in which rights
12
and obligations are eorrelative does not overcome the problem of
rights-based violence if mutual recognition is not assured. Kant
espouses a "law of reeiprocal coercion," that is "necessarily in
accord with the freedom of everyone under the principle of
universal freedomn [MM, 58]. Herbert contends that, for Kant, we
are free because we have authorized each other's possessions and
the existence of a sovereign power to guarantee those possessions.
And punishment for the violation of one's rights must take the
fonn of retribution, not at all100ked upon as violence by Kant. In
fact, it is a repudiation of violence, in that it, and it alone, is the
recognition and respect for thc dignity of each. as free and
responsible.
The contemporary view of rights has supplanted them from
the Kantian concern for moral autonomy, no longer requiring
self-ownership and individual autonomy for human dignity. This
move does aHow the extension of idea of rights to the senile and
otherwise mentally impaired, to fetuses, ete., overcoming certain
violence in our society. Herbert shows that the contemporary 10ss
of individual autonomy of the will and dignity has diverted
attention to human needs. so that now, human dignity is measured
by the material conditions of one's life. Those with lack in this
area have then been denied basic human dignity, a condition
fonned upon people by the competitive structures of
industrialized society, and hence victimized by a subtle violence
committed upon them. And the Kantian demand that people
"assert the right of humanity in their own persons9 ' [76] easily
becomes the justification of a naked demand for satisfaction and
recognition, with nothing to limit the demand or give it meaning
other than the demand itself, augmented, perhaps, by the
individual 's personal assessment of the material conditions of life
he or she needs to have met in order to enjoy basic human dignity.
This leads in many directions, including the conclusion of being
wronged simply because someone else has more, or has
accomplished more and thus appears to be worth more. Herbert
sees herein the danger of areturn to the immediacy of Hobbesian
natural right and of the conceptual content of those structurcs
condemned for their legitimation of structural violence. Thus,
under the guise ofovercoming structural violence, we see areturn
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to another structural vioJence, as l'lcrbert shows, with the concept
of human fights as a conccptual enabler, untempered by
considerations ofpersonal responsibility. He goes on to show that
the "act by which one asserts the fight of humanity in his own
person is 10gicaJly indistinguishable from thc act by which one
does violence to another. The structures ofviolence have not been
escaped" [80]. He sees that perhaps areturn to Kantian-Fichtean
idea of personal responsibility or to some Hobbesian notion of
political authority' is needed in order to reconcile a system of
rights with a coexistent freedom and peace.
M.C. Dillon's paper, uReversibility and Ethics: The Question
of Violence," continuing the themes of human violence and
violence in relation to language, argues against two theoretical
standpoints. The first contends that all human action entails
violence. The second contends that discourse, the traditional
alternative to violent confrontation, 18 itself necessarily violent.
Dillon contends that the conjunction of these two obscures
significant differences betwecn violent and non-violent human
bchavior and, thereby, atrophies a legitimate moral animus against
violence. The standpoint he defends rests on the assertion that
humans are capable of direct perceptual experience of thc pain of
other humans, that this experience is the ground phenomenon of
morality, and that it allows us in principle to adjudicate between
violent and non-violent action, to distinguish among kinds and
degrees of violence, and to assess evidence hearing on questions
ofvindication and cuJpability.
This essay begins with an important limitation of violence to
the human sphere of forcefuJ imposition of human will, thus
removing it from the broader conversation of violence inclusive
of natural vioJence, which itseJf, as seen above, can be seen in
humans.
Dillon points out that the "political standpoint he
[MerJeau-Ponty] attributes to Marxism is challenged by the
ethical implications of the thesis of reversibility he developed in
his lateT writings"[85]. Dillon goes on to consider this view that
violence is unavoidable, and that it is a matter of choosing OUT
violence. He contrasts this radical view that eliminates the pacifist
alternative with the equally radical view that the non violent
alternative mu~t always be sought. One always available
alternative to violent action is rational discourse, for instance, in
the peace process during a violent war. If, however, discourse
itself is considered a form of violence, then again violence is
unavoidable. And this is the argument supporting semiological
rcductionism. uTbc violence of signifiers is inescapable because
a11 experience is mediated by signifiers and is meaningless
without them.n To perceive a thing is to violate the ipseity of the
thing, since we are barred from the signified [88].
According to semiological reduction, language is always
violent, as is human action, always violating the others' propriety.
And here it becomes difficult to distinguish types of violence.
Dillon gives an intriguing account of semiological reductionism in
its view that the signified can never be present, even to the
witnesses or victims themselves, and therefore "violence atrophies
as a measure of moral judgment" [91]. Dillon sees the mistake of
semiological reductionism to lie in the inference that the
"significance of all persons, places, and events is exclusively
determined by the cultural fonns or signifiers that inform OUf
experience of them. ... meaning derives exclusively trom
signi fiers" [92]. Thus, this position demands that meaning is ideal.
hThis premises has the effect of ruling out the possibility that the
persons, pIace, and events, themselves, playa crucial role in the
fonnation and application of immanent fonns or signifiers" [91-
92]. And, ofcourse, Dillon hotds the contrary.
Dillon holds that we do have access, for judgment, to others in
the context of the ethics of reversibility, where "I am capable of
direct experience of another - where I can direclly perceive the
intentions of others in their bodily comportment, where it is
possible for roe to sense the sense of another's sensing of me -
that the perceptual experience provides an evidential basis for
judgments I may make about it" [92]. And evidence is accessible
to 'third parties, so that at least fallible but non-arbitrary judgments
can be made. And it is in this domain of discemment and
judgment that the radical positions making violence absolute fail,
in spite of a positive element of each: Marxism reminding us that
every action has a political dimension; and deconstruction in
"demonstrating the pervasive and insidious effects of systems of
I~
signifiers operating beneath the level of deliberation and
awareness" [94].
For Dillon, violenee is always bad, but is sometimes justified,
so that therefore there can be good fights and just wars. These,
however, are to be avoided except as a last recourse. There is no
purity. Yet, violenee as such cannot necessarily and in every case
be condemned. Mediation is preferable to any violence, and truth
is its ultimate ground, eommanding assent even from differing
panies. And although discourse can be violent, it is not originary
violence, but, rather, even as fallible, is OUf main recourse against
violence.
In the final analysis, 'the question of violence is finally a
question of love-hate-indifference,", a thought that according to
Dillon, has guided this essay all along its way. "Nobility, aeting in
accordance with one's highest ideals, ideals founded ultimately on
the pathos of reversibility, is the locus of the criteria by which to
judge violence" [100]. This nobility is the attempt to render the
Greek word, "Kolon," and, as such, is the basis for judging
everything, including violence.
In his article, "IAn Ethics of Violence Justifying Itselt: t
Sartre's Explorations of Violence and Oppression," Robert
Bemasconi stresses the continuities in Sartre's various reflections
on violence, emphasizing the strands of the Notebooks for an
Ethics that anticipate and shed light on the tater and more familiar
accounts. He does this, however, without implying that Sartre
held a single view across this period. Bemasconi's reflection
traces the contours ofSartre's profound insight and recognition of
the udepth of the violenee inherent in societyu [I 17]. He points
out that Sartre's various discussions of violence manifest a sense
of exploration, and hence should be read as provocations to think
further rather than as dogmas - a manner of reading that we will
see in the articlcs by Mui and Flynn, and one that Bemasconi
expertly sets into motion.
In his Notebooks for an Ethics Sartre lists principles in an
attempt to expose justifications of violence, while, in the same
work. he bies to show the revoJutionary possibiJities of violence
in invoking the same principles. He sanetions the use of violence
by the left, which itself has had violence done to it. And, even
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further, Sartre seerns to agree with the Maoists in that
revoIutionary violence bom among the masses is considered to be
moral. Bemasconi's thesis contends that such comments not only
must be seen in the context of their times, hut also must be
assessed "in the broader context of Sartre's reflections on
violence, particularly in that most exploratory of books,
Notehooks for an Ethics" [117].
This article draws a wealth of insight from the manner in
which Sartre interrelates violence, oppression, revolution and law,
with vioIence and oppression more explicitly interrelated and
distinguished. Violence can only be considered in relation to laws
that it violates, while oppression can be institutional, and thus is
legitimated by Jaw, giving sanction to the oppressing class at the
expcnse of the oppressed class. These conditions obtain for the
society with slaves, for the bourgeois society of capitalism, as
weil as in the United States society with the condition of the
blacks. This is an illustration of the insight that violence always
attempts to legitimate itself, leading to institutional forms of
violence. And it becornes part of the legitimating of the violence
against such institutions "to disclose the violence that created and
sustained" such institutions [107]. The "rights" of the oppressors
is legitimated by law, making it unlawful for the oppressed to
change the conditions ofoppression, thus revealing, for Sartre, the
connection between right and violence. And violence is the
condition for a new order to be initiated. The true revolutionary
does not claim such rights, but rather, attempts to destroy the
"idea of rights which they understand as a hoax of the privileged
class" [109]. The oppression and the right it sanctions must be
destroyed.
Bemasconi goes on to show that in the Crilique o[Dia/ectica/
Reaso1l, the emphasis moves from the act to the conditions of
violence, focusing on violence as scarcity, and thus rcsolving the
negative in history. Sartre aims in this work is to appeal to history
rather than to economic or sociological interpretation,
emphasizing fTee praxis over detenninism. This dynamics can be
applied to the violence in colonization. "Past oppressive praxis
produced the situationn [114]. This essay takes into account the
ramifications of violence to thc colonized, the complicity of the
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oppressed, and the necessity of violenee for the eolonized, which
results from the prior violence ofthe colonizers.
These are the contours of a diseourse on the ethics of violence
justi fying itsel f.
The arbele by Constance Mui, "Rethinking the Pomography
Debate: Some Ontological Considerations," in a creative and clear
application of Sartre's philosophy, reveals the subtle violence
donc to wornen in certain expressions of pomography. In this
treatmentt Mui opens a new dialogue in feminist scholarship on
pomography by exploring the possibility of posing a different set
or questions than those posed in the debate over censorship and
pomography, thus situating the dcbate in a more constructive
philosophical framework. The article accomplishes this by
focusing the debate on gender issues surrounding an ontological
study of the body. Even for feminists and academics who respect
freedorn of expression, there is something deeply disturbing about
the pornographie portrayal of wornen, oße so offensive that it
challenges even otherwise liberal scnsibiIity. Mui rearticulates in
lucid tenns precisely what it is here that is found so disturbing.
She does this by reframing this debate in a different philosophical
construct that raises serious questions conceming authentie human
existence, that of Jean-Paul Sartre's ontology of the body, his
theory of intersubjectivity, and especially emphasizing "the look"
and the ontological categories of freedom and objecti fication.
In her exposition, Mui shows the place of human freedom in
Sartre~s ontology of human existence as forming the cornerstone
of his theory of embodiment. To exist as freedom, humans
disobey the principle of identity, do not have fixed identity, and
project existence beyond their past toward some future possibility,
thus, in this process, pulling away from any identity that our past
might have conferred upon uso This, for Sartre, is ontological
freedorn, providing a fundamental conception of person that
alJows us to speak meaningfully of concrete [reedorn in tenns of
such issues as choice and oppression. These points lead to a very
insightful presentation ofthe body.
}-{ow can an embodied person exist as freedom? Mui presents
Sartrc' s distinetion of three ontological dimensions of the body:
BOOy as Being-for-itself or body-as-subject [I am my body],
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body-as-object, and, finally, body-for-others, which, in the
traditional interpretation, runs the risk of challenging the unity of
the Iived body or the body-for-itseJf. Thus, the body-for-others is
tied to Sartre's development of "the look,n which makes one
aware of her/his body-as-object. In the look the Othcr is presented
to me as a conscious subject capable of tuming me into an object.
As such, because of the look, the other must be a conscious
subject with freedom.
It is in this light from Sartre's ontology that Mui now takes up
the problem of pomography, reconstituting women's oppression
in these ontological tenns, showing how wornen, within a culture
of "the look" - women-watching - suffer not merely a loss of
dignity, but of being. To quote Mui, "'The look' affirrns the
freedom of the looker as subject at the expense of the freedom
looked-at, the person gazed upon."[ 125] And Uthe look" in
pomography, produced for the heterosexual male voyeur,
fol1owing the same analysis, is drastically worse. Thc object of the
voyeur's gaze makes her exist in a stnJcture that reduces her
whole being to an "inert body that is solicited, probed,
scrutinized, and appropriated by a gazer." In this case, the woman
in pomography does not exist her body, she exists as a very
impersonaJ body, thus especially betraying the subjectivity of
woman. Since the woman here is not ever a particular subject,
pomography objectifies, not a woman, but rather, the idea of
woman, and thus all wornen, who suffer a loss of being.
Surprisingly, Mui admits that her argument does not imply that all
pomography is necessarily inauthentic, but rather issues a
challenge to anti-censorship feminists who are interested in
working toward a feminist "re-vision" of pomography. It is
ultimately achallenge as to whether or not "it is possible to secure
people's status as free subjects within the context of 'the look'."
[128 ]
Thomas Flynn's article, "Sartre on Violence, Foucault on
Power - A Diagnostic," focuses on violence in the work of
Jean-Paul Sartre beginning with the Preface to Frantz Fanon's The
Wretched 0/the Earth, the terlni"us ad quem of an "evolution in a
philosophical theory of violence that had occupied Sartre for
some time and which, it seems clear to me, he never resolved to
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his satisfaction" [129]. For Sartre, fratemity and vioJence are two
aspects of the social bond that he has not succeeded in
reconciling. Flynn proposes to consider 'the lerlllinlls a quo of this
theory from one of the earlier discussion of Sartre. f~e then turns
to FoucaulCs treatment of violcncc nnd power, in order to ground
some comparison and contrasts bctween Sartre and Foucault.
Flynn is attempting to cast light on the question of the possibility
and limit of dialogue diagnostic as illuminating a discourse and
practice between existentialist and post-structuraIist philosophies
in general. He shows throughout this artiele that violence ls an
abiding concern of Sartre, especially in the second half of his
career, yet as early as the composition of the Notebooks we find
hirn "coming to tenns with the chal1enge of trying to reconcile the
inevitable violence of our interpersonal and social lives with the
fuH freedom of the existentialist individual that he had
championed in Being and Nothingness'" [142].
Since Flynn considers Sartre to be always an ontologist, a
philosopher of the imagination, and amoralist, he treats Sartrets
"mini treatise" on vioJence in the Notebooks along those lines.
First, it is necessary to mention that whatever Sartre develops as a
view of violence springs from the fundamental ontological
distinctions of Being and NOlhingness, since, in violence the
freedom of the other is treated as a thing even in recognizing its
nature as freet thus rendering it captive and freet or eaptive insofar
as it is free. (This admission agrees with the analysis of Mui.]
Flynn instructively quotes Sartre's text" "the impossible ideal of
violencc is to constrain the o'ther's freedom to choose freely what
1 want... the lie Is closer to the ideal of violence than [is] that of
force," here reminding US of Ricoeur's view of the propagandist
in the violence of the political, who persuades and seduces as
modes of violence, rather than employing sheer tyrannical force.
Flynn goes on with the quote and his analysis to point out the
psychological element added by Sartre, i.e., the lie that hides the
victim's freedom-refusal in the liar's bad faith, a psychologieal
element that Foueault will be seen to avoid.
Sartre, in a sense, sets himself off fonn others to some extent,
in that nonvoluntary violence would not be an entirely meaningful
notion, as also becomes clear in the later distinction between
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physical and moral violence. This is a restricted use of the sense
of violence, but he is consistent in this. In tuming to the imaginary
and violence, we must realize the centratity for Sartre for such a
consideration, since the imagination is already central to his
onto]ogy, seen above. It is the imagination that allows us to
"derealize" perceptual objects and thus to consider possibility,
negativity and lack, as weil as to deceive. Flynn interestingly
observes, getting to the core of the role of the imagination heret
Although not all uses of the imaginary entail vio]ence, it seems to
me that most. if not all, cases of Sartrean violence emp]oy the
imaginary. And it is the act of lying that is for Sartre the model of
violence, for the lie transfonns nlan into a thing. But at the same
time it wants to keep hirn free, at least in most cases" (NE 198)
[133J. Flynn considers the lie as a compendium of the element of
Sartrean violence, summarizing it around five aspects
characteristic ofboth.
Violencet like the lic, shows an option for the inertia and
passivity of the victim as thing, exploiting the ambiguity of the
in-itself/for-itself ontology of human reality, inheriting at once its
ultimate failure. Secondly, the lie and violence entail a negation of
time by sheer power of will as refusing being-in-the-world in
favor ofan immediacy as "timeless" time ofnature, ofthings: first
by appeal to analytic necessity, carrying over into the realm of
identity and essencet as a refusal; and second, by the denial or
refusal of world, thus negating temporality. Flynn brings up a
couple ofpoints here that are important for this volume, as weil as
for the issue of violence in Sartre: "Although Sartre is
phenomenologically astute in observing the implicit collapse of
temporal spread of lived time into the atemporal instant, he
overlooks one of the most prevalent fonns of violence, namely
that which infests the future by means of threat." First, relevant to
Sartre view and to Flynn's critique, threat is a violence, not
considered by Sartre, that does indeed entail the future in
vioJence; but, second, in indicating Sartre's astuteness regarding
the temporal spread of lived time in relation to the atemporal
instant, Flynn serves to showt as arises in other articles
contributed to this volume, a place of focus in relation to a 10ss by
postmodern deconstruction, that iSt as will be seen, the 10ss of the
Jived for the abstract in Derrida's critique ofHusserl, a failure that
is not irrelevant to the question of violence, as becolncs explicit in
the article considered above: "Taming VioJence: Ricoeur and
Derrida."
The third element of the lie in violence is that of destruction
or the nihilating power of consciousness acting, in violence,
through the imagination. And fourth, as with the lie, the violent
person lives in bad faith due to the counting on the richness of the
world to support his destructions and to provide new things to be
destroyed. And, finally, like the lie, violence is a self-defeating
behavior (conduit d 'echec ) as a way of "evading the harsh
demands of praxis and the real" [137]. We can now turn to
violence and the moral.
At the heart of this consideration of violence and the moral,
Flynn notes Sartre's speaking of an "ethic of violence" '~ust as he
sometimes refers to a "bourgeois cthic." It is clear that the ethical
properly speaking, that set of relationships between free agents
mutually respecting and fostering one another's frccdom - that
this ideal. at least in our present socioeconomic condition, is
simply that." He mentions that Sartre in the Critique focusing on
the quasi transcendental role of scarcity that ends up in warring
camp. and the consequent description of violence as interiorized
scarcity. Flynn proceeds to treat three ethical concepts from the
Notebooks that entail violence: the spirit of seriousness; the ethics
of rights and duties; and bad faith.
The spirit of seriousness reflects the familiar inauthentic
attitude of the moral absolutist that Sartre so adamantly opposes
as the antithesis of moral creativjty~ thus constituting a fonn of
violence in positing values at the cxpense of Sartrean authentie
freedom. Similarly, the ethic ofrights and duties arising out ofthe
enlightenment tradition entails an acontextual ethic of obligations
and demands driving toward unity and uniformity, thus
constituting a violence to the singularity and uniqueness of the
concrete person and situation. Thi8 rendition of violence reveals
the latent violence of such a Kantian onentation that is not
brought baek to the earth of the singularity of the situation of
particular judgment in situation. Flynn goes on to show that "If
'demand' is violent in its insensitivity to the unique situation of
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each agent, 'appeal' is the bond among freedoms that respects the
individual in his or her singularity. In faet, the gift-appeal
relationship emerges from the Notebooks as the model for the
non-alienating reciprocity that authentie morality requires" [140]
And, finally, regarding bad faith, Flynn begins by disagreeing
with Sartre himself conceming the ethical import of bad faith,
showing the distinctive disvalue in the tenn. The violence of bad
faith is entailed in having another in me, as I am an other and this
other is not me, in the fonn of my obligation, in which I
deliberately eonceal from myself that I am the source of this
obligation. Of the many forms of violence eonsidered in this
context, it cao be seen that they entail any constraint on my
conseiousness-freedom imposed by another freedom contrary to
my wiJling it, even if it is from my own freedom as other. And it
is worth mentioning the three types of violence that Sartre insists
upon: Offensive. Defensive, and Counter violenee. Now Flynn
tums to Foucault on power/violence.
Flynn notes the obvious opposition between Sartre and
Foucault in the latter's rejection of philosophies of eonsciousness
and subjectivity along with totalizing thought in favor of
impersonal rules and systems, and in his linguistie turn. He then
notes three theses about Foucault's use of"powertt in the attempt
to focus on his understanding of violence. Ieading to a comparison
and contrast with that of Sartre. These theses focus on the tenn
upower" as a set of strategie relations between individuals or
groups, as relations of struggle and resistanee; his analyses of
these 15 impcrsonal as befits sueh a philosophical analysis. And
these power struggles. though impersonal, are between individuals
and groups, falling into line with his view that power denotes
"action on the action of others" [145] And Foueault comes elose
to Sartre in insisting on the need to identify the agents responsible
for social domination. Thus, it is seen that. rather than Sartre's
primacy of individual praxis in social causation, Foucault
uncovers the "mechanisms of power" as the techniques and
procedures that serve the interest of the bourgeoisie at a certain
time. And it is the notion of power in Foueault that must be seen
in relation to violence. before a comparison and contrast are
possible with Sartre.
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Power aets not directly on others, but rather on the actions of
others. In itself the exereise of power is not violence, nor a
consent, but rather is a "way of acting upon the acting subject or
acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action
[147]. This point leads to the comparison bctwecn Sartre and
Foucault on the basic interplay of power and freedom in
Foucault's analysis. Flynn shows how Foucault speaks less of
essential freedom, as does Sartre, but rather of an agonism "of a
relationship which is at the same time reciprocal ineitation and
struggle; less of a face...to... face eonfrontation whieh paralyzes both
sides than a pennanent provocation" [148].
Flynn's discussion of Sartre and Foucault to this point has
aimed at the diagnostic 3t the end, in which he compares and
contrast explieitly the two views of violenee. The first point of
agreement between them is that violenee ean take place only
between free individuals or groups, thus allowing the experience
of freedom to' be a starting point for such comparison and
contrast. Yet, Flynn indicates three points of sharp contrast: first,
their model of social intelligibility; sccond the means of analysis,
and thirdt the goal ofemancipation from violence.
Flynn suggest that perhaps the only spaee for fruitful dialogue
between these two thinkers is freedom, for each of whom this is
central. He goes on to show the problematic dimension of eaeh
thinker regarding freedom and violence, leading to impossibilities
within the doctrine of each, and concluding that this may be their
legacy to our post-modem situation, the possibility of the
impossibility of their respective impossibilities. Thus is revealed
explicitly the deconstructive process operative in this fine article,
and its place in this volume.
Riehard Cohen begins, in his artiele, uLevinas: just War or
Just war: Preface to Totality and IIljinity," with the fact that the
worst fonn of violence is war. This focus is central to the short
prefaee to Totality and lnfinity, written after, and eontinuous with,
its concluding section on the ethical relation of the faee-to...face
"between I and other where both terms retain their independence
by relating aeross moral and juridical demands, he characterizes
the pluralism of the ethical relation as alone making peace
possiblen [J 53... 154]. This artiele shows how this is the ease. The
discussion of peace at the end of this work iSt as a function of the
plurality of persons made possible by ethicst the context for the
preface on war, thus constituting, in a way, a working from war to
peace.
War, for Levinas, suspends and makes a mockery ofmorality,
holding in abeyance the command not to murder emanating from
the ethical proximity of the face to facet commanding not to
murder, and conjuring forth the responsibility and obligation for
the other in its transcendent alterity. Thust War, then, as this
suspension, is worse than the opposite of moraJity. as eviI is the
opposite of good. u ••• war exceeds opposition by totalization the
elimination of othemess. War is the mockery of the entire ethical
schematism. This schematism: (I) "absolute good orienting from
above, manifest through the transcending moral height of the
other, the other's absolute priority over the self; (2) Good versus
evil, the other as needy; (3) "absolute evil below, killing, war, the
suspension of morality. For Levinast the ethical self becomes an
insatiable desire for the most desirable as the ugood beyond
being," once this self is charged by the transcendence of the face
to face. And concrete ethical life takes place within this schema,
judging goods and evils as closer or farther from that pure,
orienting good. War is a mockery of this whole schematism. As
absolute good makes the ethical realm possible, war renders the
same realm extra - moral, "tuming it into an atnoral play of
forces, interactions whose significance comes without reference to
good and evil". War then becomcs absolute violence, "violence
absolutized, force against force" [J 58]
And if war is the ultimate ground for signification, then to be
sincerely moral is to be duped by morality, a view with which
Levinas and Cohen do not agree. Thus is revealed the context for
Levinas's initial question of being duped by morality, the context
of the entire struggle of good against evil in the light of the
hierarchical schematism mentioned above. This leads to the
relation between the truth and the good, between reason and the
moral, and to the question of whether reason can see the reason
for being moral, or, indeed, whether it has to for one to be good or
responsible. The good reaches the self at a level prior to lucidity
of reason, prior to its capacities of identification. "Knowing, then,
will take the unsolicited shock of morality far ignorance,
foolishness, naivete, slaverytt [160]. But the truth of this mind is
fixed in the concept oftotality for Levinas.
Cohen follows Levinas in tra'cing the intimate relation
between the Uinterests of epistemology and an ontology of war,
war as the ultimate vision of epistemology," [163] where reality
takes on the sense of a calculus of force. But, rather, if this
epistemology does not have the last word, and ifwe are not duped
by morality, then politics takes on a different meaning, wars
would be distinguished between just and unjust, sincerity and not
totality would be the ground of the troe, and politics would serve
or dis-serve the good [165]. And rather than might making right,
politics would become Uanother way of instituting goodness,"
[165] taking on aquasi messianic role, and peace would underlie
struggle and war. This would be a genuine peace, not the peace of
might makes right which is basically a dimension of war violating
by repressing singularity of onese)f and of others. One can
approach another in peace only by means ofproximity: ccOnly the
radical alterity of the other person has the force - moral force - to
obligate and fix the self, the self subject as subjected to the o'ther,
as responsibility for the other" [166]. This proximity is the
wherein ofthe constitution ofthe ultimate and ethical significance
of the world. In this context, genuine peace would arise from the
proximity of unique singularity in which the significance comes
from an ethical breach in the totaJity, thus transcending the reach
of the totalization of war and inscrting a non-cognitive moral
dimension into philosophical discourse. "Before one knows the
good, one does the good," [167] because the demands,
obligations, and responsibilitics are more important than
knowledge and give it significance. The desire for goodness is
more desirable than the desire to know. And the resulatant peace
is one of pluralism, oriented toward and by the good, where each
is responsible for the other, where obligations and responsibilities
weigh upon each self for each other and for all others. And this
weight is the moral self. USingularity emerges as a
nonsubstitutable responsibility, a moral burden upon which the
reality of the whole world depends. Or else there is just war. But




James Marsh, in URationality and Its Other," attempts to
outline a phenomenoJogy of the other in response to postmodern
challenges to phenomenology and other forms of western
rationality. He points out that if, indeed, modem, western
rationality is essentially opposed to the other, inevitably
dominating her, excluding her, reducing her to sameness, then a
recourse to a post-modem, post-western fonn of rationaIity
becomes necessary, whether one cal1 that 'genealogy' or 'Denken'
or 'negative dialectic' or 'deconstruction,' to name a few of the
more common alternatives.' Marsh proposes to test such claims
and answer these question by beginning smalI, doing patient
phenomenological descriptions of various fonns of rationality as
we experience them. Such descriptive accounts liberate us from
atomism in perception, and descriptively ground philosophical
discourse with evidence, thus avoiding arbitrariness in denying
the dichotomy between consciousness and the olher.
This phenomenological description of conversation,
articuJating this essential dimension, shows how such a relation to
the other occurs. In this account of a conversation on a point of
disagreement, Marsh indicates four positive possibiJities in a
non-aJienated conversation that does justice to othemess: "one
person agreeing freely and rationalJy, both persons moving to a
third position, each person modifying their position in relation to
the other's, and both persons remaining where they were at the
beginning of the conversation" [177]. Each of these possible
positions entails ablend of ideality and difference. Even in an
uncoerced comp)ete agreement, difference is present, just as in
complete disagreement, identity is present. And the negative
possibility of coercion or violence are experiences as illegitimate
reductions to sameness, as abuse, violating the basic thrust of the
conversation toward a "rational, free agreement respectful of
difference and listening to the other." This violence is experienced
as irrational or at least as inadequately rational, thus requiring a
more adequate ronn ofrationality.
Marsh uses the descriptive account to deal with objections to
such a priority given to relations to the other in a conversation. He
shows how the transcendence to the other is preserved without a
reduction of the relation descriptively ascertained. Marsh admits
his legitimate presupposition of that as true: "eidetic description of
the conversation reveals it to be govemed by the value of
consensus." Such consensus is presupposed by conversation even
when some participants are insincere. It is a deficient conversation
if that goal or norm is violated. Further, a post-modem or
Levinasian critique of phenomenology, to the extent that it is
based on a conception of consciousness as purely active, is a
caricature, since even Husserl recognized a passivity and
receptivity to conscious experience.
We experience the other person as a presence different from
that of a stone or an animal, capable of areal and genuine
conversation. thus revealing nlultiple kinds of othemess of
experience. Here alone we expericnce community in unique way
with other humans in contrast to the commonness that we
experience with things as made of the same stuff, or with animals.
This unique communitarian dimension leads us to anticipate
responses from the other not anticipated from things or animals.
Thus there is a self-revelation of interiority. In the fully reciprocal
relation of a conversation, Marsh overcomes the hyperbolical
antithesis of interior and exteriority, allowing the conversation to
leave in taet both interiority and the transcendence of the other. In
this presence of the other we have the basis for consensus "as a
regulative ideal in conversation.u
Marsh concludes that if such an account of conversation with
the other is troet then not only is such a consciousness and
conscious rationality open to its other in a first order way, but
also. such a phenomenology is open to its other, and thus is not
closed off to its other. There is not an essential gap between
rationality and its other, but rather, "an essential link and
connection. Reason in general and modemist tationality in
panicular is being most rational when it is most fully open to its
other. least rational when it is most closed.n Marsh show that if
consciousness as lived is already open as his descriptive account
shows, and if such phenomenology can criticize inadequate or
dominating ways of relating to the other, "then postmodern
rejection or transcendence or overcoming of such rationality
seems implausible." We turn now to the last article in this
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collection, one entailing a rather novel and interesting
interpretation of Sade in terms of violence.
111i8 article by Colette Michael, "La vioJence peut-eJ/e eire
L(;~ilime?," focuses on the Marquis de Sade, sonle of whose
works present the epitome of violence, seeking in Sade's own
writings for a solution to problems these works pose conceming
sexual abuse, torture, and the injustice and abuses against the
weak. Michael discusses one such solution of de Sade against
physical abuse and violence that are sometimes legal.
Although an author should not be confused with his imaginary
works and characters, the Marquis has had attributcd to hirn the
black soul [/'lime Iroire] ofhis protagonists. Michael, taking into
account the point of deconstructive critical theory, that a text can
survive the absence of its author and occasional circumstances,
noles the coincidenee of Sadc's reeent popu)arity with the
emergence of this new mode of literary criticism. Michael
questions the interpretations of Sadc's works that, overlooking his
contradictions or ignoring othcr tcxts, interpret SOfllC of his works
as antifeminist texts; or, others that, ignoring the intention of the
author, the intended audienee, the context and the code, consider
some of his texts to be pornographie. Michael proposes that the
lesson or message of Sade goes a lot further and is different than
that, even containing some positive content. She begins by
focusing on the much condemned work: A/ille et Va/cour.
From this story of violence to Aline by her sexually abusive
father, Michael draws lessons that are not the usual ones, in this
context of Sade's work. First, Aline's virtuous mother, faithful to
her marriage vows. to the point of defending her husband's
incestuous aberrations, ends up being poisoned by hirn, thus
showing 'lhat such injustice and violenee, even in obedience to
marriage vows, does not necessarily lead to happiness or
salvation. After the death of her mother, Aline, without her
mother's support to marry Valcour, her lover, and against the
violence of her father, commits suicide, thus responding with a
violence to the violence of unnatural incest. Thus, de Sade does
not suggest filial obedience or wifely submission. But such
self-suffering is not the only outcome for Sade. He sometimes
proposes revolt, as in the three, vastly differing, versions of
JuslilIe. Justine's virtues of Christian morality and her good
actions are rewarded by renewed calamities. After many
misfortunes, being raped by someone whom she helped free,
tortured, etc., she continues to have faith in the prineiples of
moraJity which she was taught and which defend the
eommandments of God and of the ChUTCh. "Nothing can make
her loose her faith" [187]. But one has to see the more subtJe
message of Sade presented by Michael: "Quite clearly Sade
condemns with one aecord the whole of French society of the 18th
century, a society which imprisoned hirn for thirty years, or, if
you prefer. a society that condemned without solid proof,
innocents such as Justine and Sade" [187]. Faced with the various
fonns of criminality, the Christian morality of Justine does not
function in her favor. Vet she simply opposes violence with her
virtue; against crime, she opposes her faith; against malefactoTs,
she opposes her Christian benevolence. These are not valid, and
she must revolt, just as Sade must revolt against the French
society that imprisoned hirn. Sade shows the necessity for revolt
with his writings that constitute a violenee yet unequaled in
Jiterature. And, with further analysis of the text, Michael shows
precisely how Sade, identifying with Justine, could weil be seen to
be a masochiste instead of the traditionally understood sadist.
Also, one could conelude from thc overly passive attitude to one
of encouraging crime, and that Justine should revolt.
It would be narrow to interpret Sade only in the antifeminist
and pornographie context, since his passages are not too arousing,
and since wornen at times also play the executioner. Thus, there is
no absolute in Sade, neither good nor bad. His works, written
while imprisoned, and shocking the innocent reader, create a
perpetuat vengeance against the society that has unjustly
condemned hirn. Against the violence against his own freedom,
he has reacted and imagined an unequaled violence in language.
uHe has in this fact created the perfect crime, a crime that
perpetuates itself each time that an offended reader rejeets and
flees itU [191]. One must clearly in certain cases refuse to bend to
abuses, even legal abuses. And Justine exemplifies another less
than obvious truth: that, in religious precepts as weIl as in laws of
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the country, obcdience is valid only jf these are acccpted equally
by thc "other." "To the question posed by Sade, what to do when
faced with violence, 'The wise and virtuous Justine, revolted from
a system, too unhappy fruit ofcorruption,' gives this response:
'Evil is useful on earth; and, when God desires it, it is surely a
mistake to oppose it.' It is up to us to interpret" [192].
In concluding, it is prudent to realize that, even in a
postmodern situation that address violence, there is no end of
violence, nor to the discourse on violence. We can, however,
make the effort to put violence in its place, and hope thereby in
some sense to hetter the human lot.
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Guest Editor·
-I would like to acknowledge the kind assistance rendered to me by Maureen
C. Mlchaels in editing this volume and my wife, Mary, ror her help in the last
days.
31
